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ABSTRACT 
 
Policies of devolving management of resources from the state to user groups are 
premised upon the assumption that users will organize and take on the necessary 
management tasks.  While experience has shown that in many places users do so and are 
very capable, expansion of co-management programs beyond initial pilot sites often 
shows that this does not happen everywhere.  Yet, much is at stake in this, with more 
widespread adoption of irrigation management transfers and other forms of community-
based resource management.  It is therefore important to move beyond isolated case 
studies to comparative analysis of the conditions for collective action.   
 
This paper identifies factors affecting organization of water users’ associations, 
and collective action by farmers in major canal irrigation systems in India, based on 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of a stratified sample of 48 minors in four irrigation 
systems (two each in Rajasthan and Karnataka).  Using key variables suggested by the 
theoretical and case study literature, the study first examines the conditions under which 
farmers are likely to form formal or informal associations at the level of the minor 
(serving several watercourses, and one or more villages).  Results indicate that 
organizations are more likely to be formed in larger commands, closer to market towns, 
and in sites with religious centers and potential leadership from college graduates and 
influential persons, but head/tail location does not have a major effect.  We then xamine 
factors affecting two different forms of collective action related to irrigation systems: 
collective representation and maintenance of the minors.  Lobbying activities are not 
more likely where there are organizations, but organizations do increase the likelihood of 
collective maintenance work. 
 
i 
 
CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction....................................................................................1 
2. Methodolgy....................................................................................6 
3. Factors Affecting Farmer Involvement in Irrigation......................................13 
Physical Environment...................................................................14 
Socioeconomic Environment..........................................................16 
4. Farmers' Organizations for Irrigation Management.......................................21 
Frequency of Formal and Informal Organizations..................................21 
Factors Influencing Farmers' Organization for Irrigation...............................23 
5. Collective Action for Irrigation Management...............................................27 
Collective Action for Maintenance.......................................................27 
Collective Lobbying Activities..........................................................32 
6. Outcomes of Farmer Participation..........................................................36 
7. Conclusions....................................................................................40 
References..........................................................................................45 
 
 
 
 
WHAT AFFECTS ORGANIZATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR 
MANAGING RESOURCES? 
EVIDENCE FROM CANAL IRRIGATION SYSTEMS IN INDIA 
 
 
Ruth Meinzen-Dick*, K. V. Raju,H and Ashok GulatiI 
 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
The devolution of responsibility and control over natural resources from government 
agencies to user groups has become a widespread policy trend that cuts across countries and 
natural resource sectors, encompassing water (especially irrigation), forests, rangelands, 
fisheries, and wildlife.1  Such programs go by a range of names (e.g. Community Based 
Natural Resource Management, co-management, or management transfer), and range from 
those that simply try to increase users’ involvement in management as a supplement to state 
management, to those that transfer full responsibility and control over resources to organized 
users.  A common feature, however, is the emphasis on increasing the participation of 
resource users in the management of the resources.   
The devolution trend has been fueled by recognition of the limits of governent 
agencies in managing resources at the local level, along with political moves toward 
democratization and public participation.  Analyses of the deficiencies of forestry, 
fisheries, and irrigation departments in developing and enforcing appropriate rules fo
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1 Devolution of resource management to user groups is distinct from, but often 
accompanied by, policies of decentralization or transfers of state powers from central or 
provincial governments to local government.  See Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999. 
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management of the resources placed under their stewardship have accumulated; so also 
have studies demonstrating that local user groups can devise institutions to manage the 
resources sustainably (for examples see Baland and Platteau 1996; Bromley 1992; 
Ostrom 1990, 1992).  The contrast between these two bodies has challenged the notion 
that the state is the only, or even the best, institution to manage critical natural resources.  
Instead, local users who live and work in the area are seen to have a comparative 
advantage over government agents in monitoring resource use and, because their 
livelihoods depend on the resource, are assumed to have the greatest incentives to 
maintain the resource base over time.   With growing pressures to use resources more 
efficiently, equitably, and sustainably, optimism that communities or user groups may be 
able to manage the resources more effectively than government agencies forms the basis 
for many programs that attempt to create or recreate local common property management 
regimes (World Bank 1996). 
While these studies have been influential in creating a paradigm shift in resource 
management, the policy shift toward devolution in the irrigation sector has received its 
greatest impetus from the fiscal crisis of the state.  The salaries of government staff and 
budgets for travel, equipment, and other management costs mount up rapidly, especially 
where a country has a large area under a resource, and needs to provide local field staff 
for its management.  When governments fac  resource constraints, budgets are stretched 
thin, and the performance of government agencies in managing the resource generally 
suffers further, creating further pressures to devolve management.  If this by itself does 
not push governments to devolve responsibility for resource management, donors who 
are approached to bail out a government in a debt crisis are likely to push for such 
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reforms, either out of a belief that users can be more effective managers, a commitment 
to participation, democratization, or privatization, or fiscal responsibility. 
As devolution trends become widespread, affecting the management of vast areas of 
critical water, land, and forest resources as well as the livelihoods of millions of people, it 
becomes essential to examine the experience of such programs.  To what extent have the 
apparent successes of community-based resource management in selected locations been 
generalizable as programs have attempted to “scale up” beyond the areas in which users have 
spontaneously organized to manage their resources or pilot projects with major investments 
in organizing communities to take on an expanded role in resource management?  While in 
many cases state agencies have not been performing these tasks effectively, it cannot be 
assumed therefore that farmers will automatically be willing or able to take on those roles.  
The policies call for considerably more time and cash contributions from farmers.  We need 
to carefully examine their willingness to become involved.  Identifying factors that create 
incentives for user participation is critical for developing better policies and effective 
implementation of any devolution policies.  This paper addresses these issues with an 
empirical study of participatory irrigation management programs in India.    
The combination of performance deficiencies under government management, 
examples of effective farmer-managed systems and serious fiscal problems have been 
manifest in the irrigation sector, and have contributed to adoption of devolution policies  
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in many countries.2  Although India has a long history of farmer-m naged irrigation 
systems, as well as numerous studies of low irrigation efficiencies and performance 
deficiencies in the irrigation sector (e.g. Chambers 1988), so long as the government gave 
priority to funding irrigation systems, suggestions to increase farmer involvement as a 
means of improving irrigation performance had little impact on policy (Brewer et al. 
1999).  But as the ar a irrigated expanded, the resources required for adequate operation and 
maintenance (O&M) also expanded.  The state and national governments treated irrigation as 
a welfare measure, and kept service fees low.  With budget constraints and priorities shifting 
away from irrigation, by the 1990s neither government subsidies nor foreign funding were 
able to make up the difference between what was collected in irrigation fees and what would 
be required for adequate O&M.  Systems deteriorated, and both the physical as well as 
financial sustainability of many irrigation systems came under threat.   
In response to these pressures, India is currently adopting a wide range of policy 
reforms aimed at increasing farmer participation in irrigation management.  But these 
policy reforms will have no effect on improving the performanc  of irrigation systems 
unless farmers respond by increasing their involvement in system management.  
Information on the conditions under which farmers are most likely to be willing and able 
to take on this role would improve the likelihood of success these policies.  Identifying 
which of these factors play a significant role requires moving beyond the case studies and  
                                        
2 A 1994 international conference on Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) drew 
participants representing 28 countries (Johnson, Vermillion, and Sagardoy 1995), and an 
International Network on Participatory Irrigation Management (INPIM) has been set up 
to further the exchange of information among those involved in devolution programs 
(www.inpim.org). 
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pilot projects which form the basis of our knowledge to date.  What is required is more 
rigorous comparative study of the conditions under which users are most likely to be 
organized and take part in irrigation management.   
One of the first major challenges is to identify what we are looking for in terms of 
farmer participation.  Simply looking for registered societies is not adequa e, as informal 
groups may be more active.  But how can we recognize informal organizations?  And what 
constitutes "good" (or "strong") organizations?  In disentangling these issues, it is useful to 
distinguish between the organizations that exist at the local level, and the activities 
undertaken collectively by farmers themselves or by the organizations n their behalf. 
Organizations alone will not have an effect on irrigation performance unless they 
are active.  The extent of collective action enables us to differentiate between 
organizations that exist only "on paper", and those that are alive.  In this study, we focus 
on collective maintenance of the canals above the lowest-lev l utle , and collective 
interaction with officials on irrigation-related issues.  We do this by asking about 
collective maintenance work on watercourses and minors—how often it is undertaken, 
and the labor and cash contributions for this work each year—and farmers' collective 
efforts to lobby for more water or services.  The value of cash, labor, and in-kind 
contributions provides an estimate of resource mobilization.  
This paper presents evidence on the extent of farmer participation in organizations 
and collective maintenance, based on empirical evidence from major canal systems in 
Rajasthan and Karnataka.  We examine the links between the physical and 
socioeconomic environment and the strength of farmer involvement, to identify the 
conditions under which farmers are most likely to participate in irrigation systems.  The 
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methodol gy of this study is described in Section 2 and descriptive information on the 
factors considered which may affect different forms of participation is presented in 
Section 3.  The next part of the paper presents findings on organizations (Section 4) and 
collective action (Section 5).  Within each of these sections, we present evidence on the 
frequency of that type of farmer involvement, qualitative analysis of the role of that form 
of participation with examples, and then relate that quantitatively to key physical and 
socioeconomic parameters to identify the environmental factors that are most conducive 
to farmer participation.  In Section 6, we look at the outcome of farmer participation in 
terms of resources mobilized, and conclude with a brief summary of findings and 
implications for devolution programs. 
 
2.   METHODOLOGY 
A number of synthesis studies have attempted to identify principles for success in 
farmer participation in irrigation (and other types of resource management), based on 
reviews of the case study literature (e.g. Baland and Platteau 1996; Bardhan 1993; 
Maloney and Raju 1994; Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997; Ostrom 1992; Tang 1992; Uphoff 
1986).  A review of this literature engenders considerable optimism for the potential of 
devolution to Water Users’ As ociations (WUAs) to solve many of the problems of 
natural resource management.  The casual reader may even assume that all that is holding 
farmers back from achieving all this is government unwillingness to transfer systems.  A few 
authors (e.g. Hunt 1989) have questioned whether the forms of farmer organization found in 
small-scale systems would apply to large-sc le systems in which the government controls the 
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headworks, but the transfer of even large-scale systems to farmer organizations in Mexico, 
Argentina, and Colombia have been used to counter these doubts.  
The optimistic picture stems, in part, from a selection bias in the case studies on 
farmer participation.  Examples with strong local organizations are far more likely to be 
written about than those where farmers are not organized.  There are several natural 
reasons for this: In traditional farmer-managed systems, where the organizations are not 
strong, the systems fall out of service or are taken over by the government.3  If ther  is no 
farmer participation in a government- a aged system, there is little to write about.  But 
by omitting cases of organizational failure or lack of organization, we are left with a 
misleading impression based on what Chambers (1988) terms "islands of salvation".  
This is illustrated by the number of articles written about Mohini, an early “successful” 
water users' cooperative in Gujarat (e.g. Patil 1987; Chambers 1988; Kalro and Naik 
1995), and the thousands of Indian and international visitors that have gone there.  Little 
attention is given to the fact that some 25 similar WUAs have been formed elsewhere in 
the same command area, but only three of those WUAs ever became functional.  
The evidence on success of participation and devolution programs is mixed.  In 
fact, devolution of irrigation management is not easy, as the experience of many such 
programs has shown.  Success depends, in large part, on having some form of water users' 
associations strong enough to assume management.  Otherwise, any state withdrawal leaves 
behind a vacuum, and amounts to a disinvestment in irrigation systems.  Some of the 
problems are attributable to poor program design, where states are unwilling to transfer 
                                        
3 Mortality creates a similar sampling bias in studies of famines: those who do not 
survive cannot be interviewed. 
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both responsibility for resource management and the authority to follow through with 
management decisions (see Vermillion 1999).  Likewise, where the additional direct and 
indirect costs farmers (including intangible transactions co ts) are asked to assume are not 
balanced by benefits that the farmers value, individuals will not participate.  
Analyses of the conditions under which collective action emerges, becomes 
effective, and is sustained over time are of great value in developing programs to increase 
farmer participation.  Ostrom (1992) has developed "design principles of long-enduring, 
self-organized irrigation systems" that point to the importance of clearly-defined 
boundaries; proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; collective choice 
arrangements (i.e. users' ability to set and modify rules); monitoring; graduated sa ctions; 
conflict resolution mechanisms; external recognition of rights to organize; and nested 
enterprises (i.e. federations).  These deal primarily with the structure and process of self-
governing organizations.  But under what conditions are we likely to find groups that 
apply these principles? 
It is useful to think of critical conditioning factors in terms of the environment 
(broadly defined to include the physical, socioeconomic, and policy environment) 
affecting the strength of organization and collective action, which in turn affects the 
performance of irrigation systems (see Fujita, Hayami, and Kikuchi 1999; Lam 1998; 
Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997; Tang 1992).  The environment can either facilitate or constrain 
organization, create incentives or disincentives for people to work together.   
Identifying the extent of farmer participation and the factors that influence its 
emergence requires comparable measures of the environmental parameters and of the 
institutions themselves.  To improve the generalizability of the findings we have gathered 
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data from a larger number of sites (48) than is usually done, and made explicit efforts to 
avoid the sampling bias inherent in many case studies. 
The study selected Rajasthan and Karnataka—two st tes in which water is scarce, 
irrigation development is critical, and which are developing policies regarding farmer 
participation in irrigation.  Within each state, we selected two major irrigation systems 
that represent different traditions of irrigation development, and differ approaches to 
farmer participation.  In Rajasthan, Chambal Irrigation System in the eastern part of the 
state has higher rainfall, more abundant water supply, and a longer history of irrigation; 
and Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana (IGNP, formerly known as Rajasthan Canal) in the 
dry western part of the state represents a project that is still being developed, holding 
sizes are larger, water is very scarce, and farmers are being resettled from a variety of 
backgrounds.  Similarly in Karnataka we collected data in the Krishna Raja Sagar (KRS) 
system, the oldest major irrigation system in the state, that has incorporated a number of 
even older tanks, and which might be expected to have a stronger tradition of local 
management, and Upper Krishna Project (UKP), a large system still being developed, in 
an area with less history of irrigation.  All four systems were chosen because they also 
have various types of irrigation reform programs in progress.  Descriptive statistics of key 
variables from each system are given in Table 1. 
The sampling unit for the field data collection is the basic hydrologic unit within 
which farmers might organize for irrigation management.  This varies somewhat from 
system to system: in Chambal, it is the minor, which covers roughly 200 ha, but in IGNP, 
where minors serve much larger areas, 1-2 w tercourse commands (chaks) were selected 
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Table 1  Mean values of physical environment variables, by system 
System Head Middle Tail Wells Command area Villages 
 (dummy variable) (number) (ha) (number) 
       
Chambal .25 .50 .25 7.1 304.6 2.3 
 (.45) (.52) (.45) (11.8) (135.1) (1.1) 
IGNP .42 .25 .33 1.2 1300.3 7.1 
 (.51) (.45) (.49) (2.3) (758.2) (3.6) 
KRS .42 .25 .33 6.0 328.5 3.1 
 (.51) (.45) (.49) (5.7) (328.2) (1.8) 
UKP .50 .42 .08 4.2 296.2 2.1 
 (.52) (.51) (.29) (6.0) (213.9) (1.1) 
Total .40 .35 .25 4.6 557.4 3.6 
 (.49) (.48) (.44) (7.4) (602.3) (2.9) 
Source: Rapid rural appraisal data, 1996/97. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
per minor.  The primary unit of analysis for this study is thus above the farm level (which 
is the normal focus for most surveys).  
To collect data at this level, the study relies primarily on rapid rural appraisal 
(RRA), combined with government secondary data.  The RRA used a combination of 
techniques to collect a consistent set of data from direct observation and interviews in 
each location.  Semi-structured interviews with groups of farmers elicited much of the 
information on key socioeconomic environmental factors, as well as indicators of 
irrigation organization and collective action.  Separate interviews with key informants 
(including government officials and farmer leaders) provided supplementary information.  
After the interviews, the research team walked through the system with farmers to 
examine the condition of the irrigation infrastructure and fields.  This, together with 
records from the Irrigation Department or Command Area Development Authority 
(CADA), provided much of the information on the physical environment of the sites. 
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Rajasthan and Karnataka are both developing policies for irrigation reform that 
includes attention to farmer participation, but the content and implementation of those 
policies differ.  Including both in the study thus ensures broad variability in devolution 
policies.  Within each state, the selection of one of the oldest and one of the newest major 
irrigation systems providing irrigation gives variability in historical experience.  There 
are other important differences within the selected systems in term  of approaches to 
farmer participation.  All four systems have programs to promote farmer organization 
through CADA staff, but these organizational efforts have not yet extended over the full 
system.  Therefore, in each system we selected some sites that have had external 
organizational efforts, and some that have not. 
Water scarcity has been identified as a key aspect of the physical environment 
that affects farmer participation in irrigation (Bardhan 1993; Uphoff 1986).  Measuring 
water scarcity is difficult because actual water deliveries and demand are costly to 
measure, especially over a large area, with much accuracy (Jurriëns 1996).  However, 
location along the canals serves as a reasonably good proxy in most systems.  After 
discussion with engineers and extension officials, and examining system maps, schematic 
diagrams, and lists of minors and distributaries, the developed area of each system was 
divided into head, middle, and tail, based on distance from the headworks.  Three minors 
were then randomly selected from each section, giving a random sample of 9 per system. 
Because this random sample was not likely to include the cases in which formal 
organizational efforts had taken place, a purposive sample of 3 other minors was added 
per system, from the list of sites that had registered societies.  These were selected in 
consultation with CADA staff, to include the most active organizations.  In IGNP, there 
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were relatively few registered societies, so the third purposive sample was an area in 
which Urmul Trust, a local NGO, had been involved in assisting an informal 
organization.  This allows comparison of those sites with formal organizations with a 
random sample that should be more representative.  This gives a total sample size of 48 
(9 randomly selected sites plus 3 purposively selected sites with official organizational 
activities in each of 4 systems). 
Many of the key concepts affecting farmer participation are difficult to put into 
concrete terms for measurement.  The complexity of measuring water sca city is one 
example, because it is influenced by many sources of supply, as well as by variations in 
water demand.   
Particular attention was given to developing indicators that would capture formal 
and informal organizations and collective action of vari us types.  Only after identifying 
the patterns of collective action did we ask farmers whether there is an identifiable 
organization, how leaders are selected, and if it is registered or has formal by-laws.  In 
addition, we asked whether there is a standing fund for the group or organization, its total 
value, how it is administered, and spent.  The questions related to organization were 
asked last, in order to avoid biasing the information collected on collective action (i.e. 
after reporting that they had an organization, farmers may have felt obliged to report that 
they cleaned canals, or after saying there was no organization, they may have thought the 
work they did was not relevant). 
One further complication in measuring participation should be recognized: many 
organizational or group activities may not occur on a regular basis.  Organizations may 
remain dormant during certain seasons or years, and only become active in the face of a 
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particular challenge (e.g. a drought year, or proposed changes in water allocation).  For 
example, one site in UKP practiced warabandi and cleaned the minor two years ago, but 
is no longer engaged in these types of irrigation activities.  The group interviews 
attempted to explore any changes over time, but still may not have c ptured these effects.   
While we have tried to develop clear and measurable indicators for many of the 
key variables, the analysis combines quantitative techniques with qualitative assessments 
and illustrations of the concepts, as well as insights derived from particular cases.  The 
quantitative analysis includes both presentation of descriptive statistics (e.g. frequency of 
organization and collective action by system) and econometric analysis.  To identify the 
relative importance of various physical and socioeconomic factors on organization and 
collective action for irrigation in the study sites we use a two-stag  logistic regression 
model.  Logistic regression allows us to examine the likelihood of an observed yes/no 
variable (e.g. the presence of an org nization or of collective action) as a function of a 
number of other variables.  The first stage analyses the likelihood of some form of water 
users' organization as a function of a number of physical and socioeconomic variables.  
The second stage examines likelihood of collective maintenance as a function of 
(predicted) organization and other factors. 
 
3.   FACTORS AFFECTING FARMER INVOLVEMENT IN IRRIGATION 
If farmer participation is being realized in some sites but not others, what 
accounts for these differences?  This study examines the role of different aspects of the 
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physical and socioeconomic environment, with variables that have been operationalized 
as follows: 
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Water supply: Water availability/scarcity is affected by location within systems, 
alternative water sources, condition of the minor, and cropping pattern.  As mentioned 
above, this study uses head/middle/tail location as a proxy for water scarcity.  Based on 
the hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped relationship between water scarcity and 
participation (because those with plentiful water don’t need to be active, and those who 
expect too little water have no incentive to be involved—see Bar han 1993), we would 
expect greatest participation in the middle.  
In addition to supply from canals, water availability is affected by alternative 
sources of supply, especially rainfall and groundwater.  Rainfall differs primarily from 
scheme to scheme, with an average of 840 mm per year in Chambal, 100 to 360 mm per 
year in IGNP, 680 mm per yea in UKP, and 700 mm per year in KRS.  In areas of higher 
rainfall (e.g. Chambal), we would expect farmers to be less dependent on irrigation than in 
very dry areas (e.g. IGNP).  Availability of private wells not only increases water supply, but 
also allows individual farmers to "opt out" of collective action to improve their water supply.  
Thus, we could expect less organization where there are many private wells.  Table 1 shows 
that the most wells were found in the oldest systems: Chambal (average of 7 per minor 
command), followed by KRS (average of 6 per sample site), and low st in IGNP (1 per 
site), where water tables are lower, and farmers have been settled for less time. 
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Size: The appropriate size of WUAs has been a matter of considerable theoretical 
and policy debate.  The experience of traditional WUAs in Asia has suggested that it is 
more difficult to organize WUAs if the units are too large, and this is reinforced by game 
theory.  The size of effective water users' organization represents a balance between 
increasing transactions costs and economies of scale.  Theoretically, smaller groups have 
an advantage in cooperation because strategies are more likely observable; the share in 
the loss from not following the rules are larger; interlinkages among group members are 
likely to be more important; and negotiation costs are lower (Bardhan 1993; Meinzen-
Dick et al. 1997). However, the effect of size needs to be empirically determined, because 
transaction costs of organizing within the group are likely to increase with size, but the 
payoffs in terms of decreased transaction costs between groups and the government will 
also increase with size.  As a result, the agencies responsible for organizing farmers may 
target larger command areas.  Several indicators of size f command are available: 
cultivated command area (CCA) in hectares, number of outlets, number of farm 
households, and number of villages.  Of these, CCA and number of villages are the most 
straightforward.  The average size command of each minor or lateral is approximately 
300 ha in Chambal, KRS, and UKP, but 1300 ha in IGNP.  A minor or lateral command 
covers an average of 2 villages in Chambal and UKP, but 3 villages in KRS (where 
settlement density is higher).  IGNP has a more dispersed settlemen  patt rn, with an 
average of 7 abadis (hamlets) per minor.  In IGNP there may be more correspondence 
between residence and fields, but there differences in the village of origin may be important.   
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SOCIOECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Heterogeneity: In general, we would expect less participation where farmers live 
in different villages or are from different caste backgrounds because such types of social 
heterogeneity make communication and cooperation more difficult.  By contrast, where 
people are used to interacting in a common neighborhood or other social sphere, the 
marginal cost of getting together for irrigation is lower, and enforcing rules is easier if 
people want to protect their reputation and goodwill because of linkages between 
irrigation and other activities.  Available information from the RRA on heterogeneity of 
background includes data on number of villages, castes, dependence on irrigation and 
non-agricultural income of farmers in a hydrologic unit.  KRS had the most homogeneous 
caste distribution, with less than 3 castes per site, while Chambal had 3.7 castes, UKP 4 
castes, and IGNP had greatest variability, with 4.4 castes per site.4  Newer settlements are 
also likely to have less tradition of coordinated activity, a factor that will be captured by the 
dummy variables for system.   
Markets: The effect of market penetration on collective action has been 
considerably debated.  On the one hand, we might expect a negative relationship between  
market distance and participation, because sites closer to market have lower costs for 
interaction with the government, both for registering a society and for making their  
                                        
4 Dependence on irrigation and non-agricultural income were not used in the 
analysis because they were too highly correlated with the system dummy variables.  
Patterns of landholding, including holding size and extent of tenancy, were difficult to get 
from group interviews, and difficult to compare across sites.  Moreover, Baland and 
Platteau (1996) suggest that heterogeneity of asset structure is less likely to be a barrier to 
collective action than heterogeneity of social background and objectives.  
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demands heard.  Furthermore, sites closer to market are likely to be more commercially 
oriented, and therefore have higher payoffs to effective irrigation.  However, Fujita, 
Hayami, and Kikuchi (1999) point out that in rural communities with little exposure to 
urban market activities, members expect to continue their interaction indefinitely, and 
hence have incentives to cooperate.  Access to markets ften decreases this 
interdependence, and therefore might reduce the likelihood of collective action. 
Other organizations: The presence of other local organizations provides 
information on organizational density and social capital.5  In the regression analysis, the 
number of temples and cooperatives are used as two indicators of social capital.  
Maintaining a temple requires considerable amounts of collective action, and the 
resources mobilized to support temples are often quite large.6  These festivals nd 
irrigation work can be complementary, as seen in one example from UKP, where part of 
the fines from maintenance defaulters was paid to the festival fund.  Thus, temples can be 
a unifying force, and provide experience in raising resources for common purposes.  
However, the presence of many temples in the local area can also represent considerable 
factionalism that divides, rather than unites.  The net effect of temples should therefore be 
determined empirically.  Cooperatives (e.g. for credit, marketing, or mil ) are expected to  
                                        
5 The RRA collected information on whether there are active village panchayats, 
informal caste panchayats, cooperatives (other than for irrigation), and other 
organizations within the villages.  Village panchayats provided no variability, because all 
sites reported that tis institution exists.  The presence of any NGO in the area is also 
noted, as a potential stimulus for cooperation.  The only NGO operating in the study site 
areas is Urmul Trust, which has been instrumental in organizing sangatans, or societies 
for a number of purposes, in 3 of the sites in IGNP.  
6 Other religious centers, such as mosques or churches, could have a similar 
effect, but only temples were found in the study sites. 
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increase the likelihood of irrigation organization, by providing existing networks among 
farmers; by providing local people with experience in setting up and operating a formal 
organization (especially where WUAs are set up on the co peratives model); and by 
drawing the attention of CADA Cooperatives Wing staff, who are generally charged with 
organizing WUAs. 
As might be expected of a new settlement scheme, IGNP had the lowest incidence 
of social capital: less than 60 percent of sites had a temple, and less than half had a 
cooperative (see Table 2).  By contrast, 58 percent of Chambal sites reported 
cooperatives, and there was an average of 3.4 temples per site.  Karnataka had more 
temples (5.8 in KRS and 9.0 in UKP), and KRS had the ighest proportion of 
cooperatives (75 percent of sites).  KRS also had the most other organizations, including 
youth associations, religious or festival societies, and farmers' associations. 
Leadership: Information on leadership potential was collected by asking about 
college graduates and influential people in the village.  The former are expected to have 
education and ideas that will enable them to deal with formal organizations.  An 
“influential” person refers to someone who has external recognitio and influence, such 
as an MLA or other politician, retired army officer, or other official.  We did not pre-
define "influential", but tried to elicit examples from the group interviews. 
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Table 2  Mean values of socio-economic environment variables, by system 
System Castes 
Market 
Distance Temples 
Cooper- 
atives 
Influential 
Persons Graduates Tractors 
 
(number) (km) (number) (number) (dummy 
variable) 
(number) (number/ 
household) 
        
Chambal 3.7 27.2 3.4 .58 .25 4.9   .09 
 (1.6) (14.7) (1.5) (.51)   (.45) (3.8) (.06) 
IGNP 4.4 27.2 0.58 .42 .42 1.1 .14 
 (2.2) (22.6) (0.51) (.51)   (.51)  (1.8)  (.09) 
KRS 2.7 10.9 5.8 .75 1.0 16.7  .01 
 (.60) (5.9) (2.8) (.45)   (.0) (14.1)  (.02) 
UKP 4.0 13.6 9.0 .50 1.0 7.9 .05 
 (1.0) (10.2) (5.1) (.52)   (.0) (5.8)   (.06) 
Total 3.7 19.7 4.7 .56 .67   7.6 .07 
 (1.6) (16.1) (4.3) (.50)   (.48)  (9.6)   (.08) 
Source: Rapid rural appraisal data, 1996/97. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
 
Karnataka had the highest average levels of l adership potential, by these 
indicators, with some form of influential persons identified in all sites, and an average of 
8 graduates per site in UKP and 16.7 in KRS (Table 2).  By contrast, IGNP had only 1 
graduate per site and only 42 percent reported influen ial people; KRS had 5 graduates, 
on average, but only a quarter of sites had influential persons.   
SELECTION OF VARIABLES 
The sample of 48 sites in this study permits quantitative analysis; however, it does 
not provide enough degrees of freedom to xa ine all the factors that have been 
suggested as influencing organizations or collective action, especially because certain 
variables (e.g. rainfall, average holding size) are highly correlated with the dummy 
variables for system.  Furthermore, because predicted values of organization are used in 
estimating the models for collective action, somewhat different sets of variables must be 
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used for stages I and II (Johnston 1991).  Thus, we have had to choose those factors that 
seemed most likely to influence each type of outcome.7  B cause outsider organizers 
(usually from CADA) have played a major role in formation of organizations, the 
presence of organizations reflects a combination of factors that draw CADA attention as 
well as those that make farmers likely to be receptive to their efforts.  The variables for 
the organization equation are therefore those that are generally known by CADA and 
similar outsiders.  Other internal factors that are more likely to affect local cooperation, 
but may not be readily known from outside, were used in the models for collective action. 
For example, location along the canal is well known to CADA, and is an 
important proxy for water availability.  The density of wells also influences water 
availability, but is not easily known by outsiders.  Whereas head or tail end of the system 
affects all farmers on a minor (though those at the tail of the minor suffer most), wells 
provide an alternative source of water for some farmers, allowing some individuals to 
"opt out" of collective action for canal irrigation, if they so choose.  Therefore, this study 
uses WELLS—(the number of wells in the minor command, standardized by number of 
farming households) as an additional indicator of water availability in the collective 
action models.   
As an indicator of size, CADA evaluates minors based on command area (CCA), 
so this is used as an indicator of size in the first stage.  However, the models for 
collective action use number of VILLAGES (or chaks in IGNP) as an indicator of size 
and social heterogeneity, because this is likely to have more relevance when it comes to 
                                        
7 For a more complete discussion of the methodology and selection of explanatory 
factors, see Gulati, Meinzen-Dick, and Raju 1999. 
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getting people together to accomplish something.  The number of castes (CASTES) in the 
command area is included as a key locally-known social variable, to see if difficulties in 
getting cooperation across caste lines are a barrier to collective action. 
Only one indicator of potential leadership was included in each of the collective 
action equations: GRADUATES in the maintenance equation because in a number of 
sites, it was gradu tes that were spearheading maintenance activities; and 
INFLUENTIALS in the collective lobbying equation, because those with outside connections 
seemed likely to provide a focal point for joint interaction with outsiders.  The collective 
lobbying equation also included a variable for TRACTORS (number in the command area, 
standardized by number of households) because tractor trolleys provided a means of 
transport, especially for bringing groups of farmers to irrigation department offices.   
 
4.   FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 
FREQUENCY OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Setting up organizations has received considerable attention in devolution 
programs, and the number of organizations registered or in the process of forming have 
often been used as the benchmark of success.  But despite this activity, when we look 
across the total set of minors in the sample systems, local organizations for irrigation 
management are not common, except where special programs have been conducted.  
Table 3 presents findings of the extent of organizations and collective action, by sample 
system.  Among the 36 randomly selected sites (i.e., excluding those which had pilot 
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organizational activities by CADA), only 1 (in UKP) had a formal organization, and even 
that had been initiated by CADA staff.  The existence of formal irrigation organizations 
reflects both outreach on the part of the agency, and receptivity on the part of the farmers.   
The formal organizations in Chambal were set up as pani panchayats, and in KRS 
and UKP as irrigation cooperatives.  This was not a reflection of local farmers' choice of 
organizational form, but of official policy regarding the type of organization to promote.  
Registration of a society under any act is not an easy process.  Even after farmers are able 
to get a consensus among a minimum number of members to form an organization, and to 
collect the initial share capital from members, there are long delays due to the location of 
the office of the registrar of cooperatives in district hea quar ers.  The very procedure of 
registering a society causes delays: getting approvals at different levels, inspection of the 
proposed society place, and other activities by the registrar office personnel.  Farmers are 
not generally familiar with all these procedures, and required supportive documents are 
not readily available.  For example, some of the farmers' groups in Chambal issued 
receipts for share capital on receipt books purchased in the bazaar, and not on the proper 
type of receipt books, and were told their records were therefore not valid. 
Because of these difficulties with registration, many local farmers’ groups do not 
opt for registration of their  ‘organization’ unless it is essential.  Three of the randomly 
selected sites had informal organizations  (1 in IGNP,8 2 in KRS).  In KRS, the 
                                        
8 The second informal organization in IGNP was from the purposive sample.  
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organizations build upon traditional institutions for local management of tanks, which 
predated the construction of the system in 1931.9 
 
Table 3  Indicators of farmer participation, by scheme 
                Organization            Collective Action 
 
System name 
 
 
Water Users’ Associations 
 
Joint interaction 
 
Maintenance of minor 
 None Informal Formal No Yes No Yes 
 
Chambal 9 0 3 2 10 8 4 
IGNP 8 2 2 5 7 5 7 
KRS 7 2 3 2 10 2 10 
UKP 8 0 4 3 9 4 8 
TOTAL 32 4 12 12 36 19 29 
Percent of sites       8.33        25.00 75.00 60.42 
Source: Rapid rural appraisal data, 1996/97. 
 
FACTORS INFLUENCING FARMERS' ORGANIZATION FOR IRRIGATION 
What accounts for where we find organizations?  Because CADA staff or other 
outsiders have initiated many of the farmers’ organizations for irrigation, the presence of 
an organization must be understood as a combination of government (or other 
organizations') attention and farmers' initiative and/or willingness to be part of such an 
organization.  Using the theoretical factors suggested in the literature (as operationalized 
above), logistic regression analysis is employed to modeling the probability of farmers' 
irrigation organizations as a function of: 
                                        
9 One of the formal organizations in UKP was also established in an area with a 
tank that predated the canal system.  
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 dummy variables for system (IGNP, CHAMBAL, KRS, and UKP), which 
capture the effects of different state government and local project policies, 
plus old and new systems and rainfall differences; 
 dummy variables for head and tail (HEAD and TAIL) of the system, as a 
proxy for water availability/scarcity (with middle of system as default); 
 size of hydrologic unit, indicated by command area of the minor (CCA); 
 distance to market (MARKET), as an indicator of market access and 
transportation costs; 
 social capital of the minor command, indicated by presence of other 
cooperatives (COOPS) and temples (TEMPLES) in the minor command; 
 leadership potential, indicated by number of college graduates 
(GRADUATES) and by a dummy variable for an influential person 
(INFLUENTIALS) in or from the command. 
Results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.  The coefficients for all system 
dummy variables are significant, but the sites in Karnataka are significantly less likely to 
have an organization than those in Rajasthan, once other factors were controlled for.  This 
is not surprising for Chambal, because they have had an active participatory irrigation 
management (PIM) program.  The IGNP authorities had seemingly not made as much 
progress at the time of the study, but once the physical and socioeconomic factors were 
controlled for, IGNP was seen to be doing almost as well as Chambal.  Neither the 
dummy variables for head or tail were significant; indicating that location on canal (and, 
by extension, ease of water availability) did not have an effect.  Size of minor command 
did, however, have a significant positive effect, which means that larger commands are 
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more likely to have an organization.  That may be somewhat surprising to those who 
expect it to be easier to organize a smaller group, but smaller command r as are less 
likely to attract CADA's attention and organizational efforts.   
Market distance has a significant negative effect, implying that those who are 
farther from the market centers are less likely to have organizations, consistent with the 
hypothesis given earlier.  This may be because the commercial opportunities are less 
available to make irrigation profitable in more remote sites, but it is more likely to reflect 
the ease of access to towns (and townspeople, like government agents).  Those who are 
closer in are more likely to be visited by CADA organizational staff, and will have lower 
travel costs for the many visits required, especially for registering an organization. 
 
Table 4  Results of logistic regression model for probability of any type of farmers' 
organization for irrigation 
Variable B S.E. Wald Statistic R 
IGNP             -8.15** 3.95 4.26  -.184  
CHAMBAL   -8.82** 4.36 4.08 -.177  
KRS     -15.67** 6.51 5.79 -.239  
UKP     -15.31** 6.00 6.51 -.260  
HEAD        1.46  1.85  0.63 .000  
TAIL      1.94 2.23  0.76 .000  
CCA      0.0031** 0.0015 4.17 .180  
MARKET     -0.092** 0.04  4.33 -.187  
COOPS     3.21 2.08  2.39 .077  
TEMPLES    0.60** 0.28  4.70 .201 
GRADUATES  0.17* 0.09  3.56 .153  
INFLUENTIAL  4.83**  2.19  4.84 .206 
Model Chi-Square = 40.586 with 12 degrees of freedom; p=.0001 
Percent correctly predicted = 91.67. 
Source: Rapid rural appraisal data, 1996/97. 
** Significant at 0.05 probability level 
*   Significant at 0.10 probability level 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the presence of other types of cooperatives in the 
command of a minor does not significantly increase the likelihood of an irrigation 
organization.  However, the number of temples in the villages of that command area does 
have a significant positive influence on the likelihood of organization for irrigation.  The 
social capital generated by religion seems to have a stronger influence on organization for 
natural resource management than that created by cooperatives.  This is despite the fact that 
organizing WUAs has been largely entrusted to the cooperatives wing of CADA, and 
familiarity with cooperative structures would presumably facilitate dealing with the 
registration and management process for formal WUAs.  However, it is possible that many of 
the cooperatives are not active enterprises or that the links created between m m rs of a 
cooperative do not have as strong or pervasive an effect as the links created by temples.10 
Among leadership variables, both the presence of college graduates and 
influential persons have a significant positive effect on irrigation organization.  Graduates 
would presumably offer innovation and have the skills required for setting up and 
managing a formal organization.  Influential people from the local area offer networks of 
contacts (both within and outside the local area) that could draw officials' attention to the 
area, and could be useful in starting an organization for irrigation. 
Overall, this model predicts 92 percent of the cases correctly.  Despite the 
somewhat small sample size and large number of variables, the model is still significant.  
It appears that in addition to scheme (state) characteristics, physical size and location, and  
                                        
10 It would be desirable to test the effect of other types of organizations, as well, 
but due to the limited degrees of freedom, this model has to select two that were thought 
to have the strongest effect on irrigation activities. 
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social capital and leadership play an important role in influencing where organizations 
are likely to become established, and these outweigh water scarcity (as indicated by 
head/middle/tail of the system). 
 
5.   COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 
Irrigation organizations are not an end in themselves.  For devolution reforms to 
achieve objectives of financial and physical sustainability of the irrigation systems 
requires some form of collective action among the farmers.  In this case, we focus 
particularly on collective action for maintaining the minors and collective lobbying 
activities by farmers. 
COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR MAINTENANCE 
Much of the success of participatory irrigation management as a means to 
improve system performance and reduce the fiscal burden of irrigation systems on the 
government hinges on farmers' willingness to take on an expanded role in operation and 
maintenance above the outlet.  Currently farmers are responsible for all maintenance of 
watercourses below the outlet, and all sites reported that farmers were doing some form 
of watercourse maintenance.  In some instances, this was done by farmers as individuals 
whenever the channel supplying their fields needed repairs.  However, in a number of 
cases even watercourse cleaning and repairs were done collectively by calling a number 
of workdays when each needed to supply labor.  In some instances, defaulters were fined 
unless it was due to exceptional hardship, in which case the other farmers would do the 
 
 
 
 
28
maintenance for the defaulter.  In two cases in IGNP, if a farmer did not clean the 
watercourse, the work was auctioned amog other farmers, starting at Rs 5–10 per foot of 
watercourse.  One of the downstream farmers would do the work, and the group would 
force the defaulter to pay. 
Responsibility for maintenance of minors and distributaries above the outlet into 
watercourses currently rests with the government.  However, in over 60 percent of cases, 
farmers reported that they were undertaking some form of maintenance activities above 
the outlet (Table 3).  Chambal was the only system in which less than half (4 of 12) of the 
sites reported farmers working above the outlet, while 10 of 12 sites in KRS had a high 
degree of farmer maintenance.  Clearing weeds and desilting were the most common 
forms of maintenance, although some other types or repairs may also be undertaken.  
Some villages have collective action for canal cleaning and repairs on certain days of the 
season (usually twice a year at the beginning of the season).  Absentees have to pay a penalty 
ranging from Rs 30 to Rs 60 per day per person.  When farmers refuse to pay the penal y, the 
group stops the water supply to their particular fields and doubles the penalty amount to 
restart the water supply.  Examples of the range of maintenance activities include: 
 In one village of UKP, farmers collectively attend to the minor cleaning and 
repair works on every Monday and absentees have to pay Rs 25/person/day.  
In this village one large landholder with 30 acres incurred Rs 1200 on his own 
to realign the lateral so it would have a better slope.  In another village, 
farmers decide to work for a half or one day before the season begins to clean 
the unlined minor and field channels.   
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 In KRS, it is mainly tail enders who get together and desilt the canal, clear 
stones and stubble, before irrigation starts.  Sometimes, soon after the rainy 
season, farmers in small groups do this kind of work to repair the canals.  In at 
least one case, farmers of one distributary worked for desilting a neighboring 
distributary, and participation was nearly 80%.  But this was mainly owing to 
good mutual relationships among the farmers of two villages.  
 In Chambal, CADA emphasizes cleaning of minors as one of the indicators of 
success in its PIM efforts.  Young men in some of the pilot organized areas as 
well as in minors without an organization have mobilized farmers to clean the 
minor, assigning each to desilt a certain length of the canal. 
 In IGNP, sandstorms cause heavy siltation of the canals.  Farmers have done 
much of the work to clean the minors because other laborers are not available 
in this settlement area with low population densities.  In some cases, only the 
poorer farmers have done the work as employees of the irrigation department.  
This was not included as instances of collective action.  But in other cases, 
farmers have done the work on a v luntary basis, or all farmers have 
participated and contributed their labor, with any payment going into a 
collective fund.  Where farmers do not have strong organization or leadership, 
baildars or other irrigation department staffs are instrumental in calling the
workday and mobilizing the farmers to clean the canals.  In many instances 
the farmers reported that they preferred to do the work themselves, because 
when contractors did the job, they did not do it as carefully, and the silt that 
had been removed blew back into the canals.  For the contractors, 
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maintenance work represented the chance to make more money, but farmers 
who depend on water from those canals preferred to do a more thorough job. 
While such examples demonstrate farmers’ capacity to do collective maintenance, 
these initiatives were not found in every site.  If farmer maintenance of minors is to be an 
objective of devolution programs, to relieve the state of such recurring expenditure and/or 
allow it to redeploy staff to new activities, what accounts for whether or not farmers will 
be willing and capable of taking over the maintenance of the system at higher levels (e.g. 
distributary and minor)? 
The models for collective action are similar to the organizational model in that they 
include dummy variables for each system, for head and tail location within the systems, and 
for distance from market.  The collective action models also include the predicted value of 
whether there would be a Water Users’ As ociation (WUAp).  This model also substitutes 
VILLAGES for CCA, and adds WELLS and CASTES, but only includes GRADUATES 
among the leadership variables, as mentioned above. 
The logistic regression model for farmer maintenance of the minors is presented 
in Table 5.  Results indicate that a greater numb r of villages on a minor reduce the 
likelihood that farmers will get together for maintenance.  This may be because of the 
greater physical as well as social separation when people farming in the same 
hydrological unit do not also live together.  It is noteworthy, however, that the predicted 
value of irrigation organization (WUAp) has a significant positive effect, indicating that 
organizations do facilitate maintenance activities.  No other factors in the equation were 
significant, but factors that were significant in the equation for organization (e.g. CCA, 
temples) exert an indirect influence on collective action via their effect on organization. 
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Table 5  Results of logistic regression model for probability of farmer maintenance 
of minors 
Variable B S.E. Wald R 
IGNP        3.56 2.27 2.45 .082  
CHAMBAL         0.74 1.59 0.22 .000  
KRS          1.83 1.81 1.02 .000  
UKP          1.55 1.56 0.99 .000  
HEAD          0.72 0.89 0.65 .000  
TAIL          1.12 1.14 0.96 .000   
VILLAGES       -0.39* 0.21 3.41  -.146  
MARKET       -0.04 0.03 1.37 .000  
WELLS     -4.22 6.00 0.49 .000  
GRADUATES    0.05 0.07 0.37 .000  
CASTES        -0.15 0.26 0.31 .000  
WUAp   2.28* 1.17 3.81 .165  
Model Chi-Square  = 18.721 with 12 degrees of freedom; p = .0955. 
Percent correctly predicted = 77.08. 
Source: Rapid rural appraisal data, 1996/97. 
* Significant at 0.10 probability level 
 
 
After all that has been invested in forming organizations, it is encouraging to see 
that irrigation organizations do increase the likelihood that farmers will undertake 
maintenance of the minors.  The higher likelihood of farmer maintenance where 
organizations have been established may stem from government efforts to promote 
farmers' involvement.  Alternatively, the legal recognition f registered organizations may 
empower farmers to undertake maintenance, where unorganized groups are prohibited from 
doing work on "government" canals.  Theoretically, organizations should facilitate collective 
action for maintenance because maintenance activities require coordination, e.g. in calling 
working days, determining the labor and cash contributions of each person, and monitoring 
and sanctioning those who do not participate.  Particularly regular maintenance is more 
likely when there is an organization that makes these issues routine.  
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The significant relationship between organization and maintenance is important 
because, by taking on a role in maintenance, farmers are contributing resources for 
system management and taking action which improves the efficiency of irrigation 
deliveries and the physical sustainability of the irrigation system (provided it is well 
done).  But beyond the contribution to the financial and physical sustainability of 
irrigation systems, the involvement of farmers' organizations in maintenance can improve 
the sustainability of the organizations themselves.  Literally thousands of farmers' 
organizations have been set up for irrigation management, but if they have no role, they 
become defunct.  If farmers' involvement in aintenance, rather than simply societies 
registered, becomes the indicator of success in participatory irrigation management 
programs, it is more likely that the efforts devoted to such reforms will have a stronger 
impact on the performance of irrigation systems.  
Nevertheless, it is also important to note that not all formal organizations have 
been involved in maintenance.  This indicates that further attention is required to ensure 
that the organizations become (and remain) active after they are set up. 
COLLECTIVE LOBBYING ACTIVITIES  
Although PIM programs focus on maintenance activities, farmers themselves are 
more likely to get together for a variety of lobbying activities.  Joint interaction with 
irrigation agencies is quite widespread: farmers in 75 percent of the sites reported this 
type of collective action.  Representing the common interests of irrigators in making 
demands on the government appears to be one of the easiest types of collective action to 
organize.  In this, farmers are trying to mobilize "external" (i.e. government) resources, 
 
 
 
 
33
which represents a positive sum activity in which all farmers on a minor or watercourse 
can benefit.  By contrast, sharing a fixed amount of water or mobilizing resources of the 
farmers to maintain facilities are zero-sum, at best.11   
The exact form of the collective action ranged from submitting joint written 
petitions, to sending a delegation of local leaders to various offices to request water 
issues or system repairs, to mobilizing groups of ten to fifty farmers to go to the irrigation 
agency offices with requests.  In several cases, the farmers even organized agitations or 
demonstrations to press their demands. These trips and other forms of interaction are 
often funded by an ad hoc collection from all the farmers, or if farmers each pay their own 
way, they may pool their funds to meet all expenses.  Tractor trolleys were often used to 
transport groups. Despite the variation in forms of interaction, collective representation can 
be distinguished from individual interaction with agencies because those who go to meet 
with the officials go as representatives of the collective, not on their own behalf.   
The nature of demands made by the farmers include additional releases of water, 
better information regarding when water will be released, lifting of cropping restrictions, 
and repairs of breached canals or other facilities.  A major cause of protest is the lack of 
communication between the water suppliers and water users.   
Although collective representation often takes place spontaneously, without any 
organization, forming registered water users' associations may strengthen the 
effectiveness of lobbying efforts, especially for demanding a greater voice in decision- 
                                        
11 Blomqvist (1998) refers to activities such as collective lobbying for more water 
as external solutions, in contrast to mobilizing resources for maintenance, which is an 
internal solution.  See also Chambers (1988:171). 
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making on cropping patterns and delivery schedules for the scheme as a whole.  In most 
schemes there is some form of irrigation management council that includes 
representatives of the irrigation department, CADA, and other officials.  Local politicians 
such as MLAs are also included in the bodies, but th re are no formal farmers' 
representatives.  As various WUAs become stronger, they are lobbying to be included in 
these decision-making forums.   
When written petitions and small group meetings with officials do not provide a 
satisfactory response, then water users have resorted to mobilizing large groups to draw 
attention to their demands.  Some agitations are organized at taluk, district, and state level.  
Depending on the level, these demonstrations may mobilize from 50 to 5000 affected 
farmers.  At the state level, tens of thousands of farmers may even come for demonstrations. 
These large group agitations, which include rallies and processions on major roads to get 
attention, are generally organized with the support of a political group or party.   
The collective representation provides a contribution to irrigation management by 
improving the flow of information between irrigation agencies and farmers.  Where 
Irrigation Department staff lack the time or transport to visit the entire irrigation system, 
farmer's representation alerts them to areas that need water or repairs.  On the other side, 
farmers can learn what constraints exist in total water supply or repair budgets.  However, 
this is a selective information flow, based on farmers' ability to make their case, and not 
necessarily on the severity of the problems faced.  
What factors affect the likelihood of collective interaction?  The model for 
collective lobbying is the same as that for collective maintenance, with the addition of a 
variable for density of tractors (which are used in transporting farmers to gatherings), and 
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among leadership potential variables, influential persons (instead of graduates) because 
those individuals may spearhead or facilitate lobbying efforts.  Table 6 presents results of 
the analysis.  Farmers in IGNP were much less likely to become engaged in these 
activities, perhaps because of the larger distances that must be covered between farms 
and government offices in that project.  Head enders are significantly less likely than 
middle or tail enders to engage in these activities, probably because they are likely to get  
 
Table 6  Results of logistic regression model for probability of collective 
representation  
Variable B S.E. Wald R 
IGNP -13.17* 7.17 3.37 -.144 
CHAMBAL -4.31 3.95 1.19 .000 
KRS -7.25  5.67 1.63 .000 
UKP -7.61  6.43 1.40 .000 
HEAD -4.24** 2.04 4.31 -.186 
TAIL   2.41  2.74 0.77 .000 
VILLAGES 0 .55 0.51 1.14 .000 
MARKET  -0.07 0.06 1.29 .000 
WELLS 23.91  16.18 2.18 .053 
TRACTORS 26.98* 15.35 3.09 .128 
INFLUENTIALS 3.01 3.91 0.59 .000 
CASTES 1.73 1.10 2.48 .085 
WUAp 2.70 2.02 1.79 .000 
Model Chi-Square = 42.700 with 13 degrees of freedom; p = .0001 
Percent correctly predicted = 85.42 
Source: Rapid rural appraisal data, 1996/97. 
** Significant at 0.05 probability level 
*  Significant at 0.10 probability level 
 
 
the water anyway, due to their location.  The number of tractors does significantly 
increase the likelihood of collective lobbying, but whether this is because tractors have a 
practical value in transportation for lobbying or indicate "progressive" farmers who are 
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likely to make their demands heard, cannot be determined.  Other variables have no 
significant effect—not even the predicted variable for irrigation organization.   
Thus, not having an organization does not seem to constrain farmers from coming 
together to make their demands heard as the need arises (Chambers 1988).  For IGNP, 
Ramanathan and Ghose (1994) explain that without local decision-m king forums, 
people move immediately from "atomized relationships" of individual farmers with the 
bureaucracy, into mass political movements.  Because these protests happen sporadically, 
collective efforts can be arranged on an ad hoc basis.  However, this does not measure the 
effectiveness of the lobbying.  The presence of an irrigation organization may give 
farmers more credibility in interacting with the government.  Indeed, one of the potential 
advantages for farmers of organizing would be to gain a stronger voice in system 
management decisions (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). 
 
6.   OUTCOMES OF FARMER PARTICIPATION 
Water Users' Associations are not ends in themselves.  From the farmers' or 
government's standpoint, they are only worth supporting if they improve the efficiency, 
equity, or sustainability of irrigation systems.  Because of the cross sectional nature of 
this study and the wide range of factors (in addition to farmer participation) affecting 
irrigation performance, we are not able to do a full impact assessment.  To assess the 
outcomes of farmer participa ion we focus on the resource mobilization and irrigation 
activities undertaken collectively.  Any form of collective action that improves the 
maintenance of infrastructure or timeliness of water deliveries is a contribution to system 
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performance.  Furthe more, the total value of farmer resource mobilization provides an 
indicator of what farmers contribute toward their systems.  Before any moves to change 
formal irrigation fees, it is essential to see the issue from the farmers' standpoint, by 
recognizing what they are already paying.  In some cases those contributions may not be 
channeled effectively under the present set-up (e.g. when large groups go to irrigation 
officials several times a season to petition for water or repairs).  Identifying such situations 
and ways to make those contributions have a greater effect on farmers' water supply offers 
the opportunity for farmers as well as the government to benefit from reforms. 
The total resources mobilized for maintenance are significant.  Resource 
mobilization for maintenance of the minor includes substantial labor contributions.  
Among farmers' groups involved in maintenance above the outlet, the contribution per 
minor averaged over Rs. 16,500.12  Contributions per site were highest (near Rs. 30,000 
per minor) in Rajasthan, and lower in Karnataka.  The lowest average contribution was 
Rs. 4,761 in KRS.  This is due to both the lower average size of minors in KRS and the 
lower imputed wage rate (Rs. 30 per day, as opposed to Rs. 50 per day in the labor-sc rce
IGNP).  When contributions are standardized per unit of command area, the value of 
farmer's collective work averages Rs. 75 per ha over all sites that have farmer  
                                        
12 Total resources mobilized could have been used in a tobit analysis, ins ead of 
the logit analysis for likelihood that maintenance would be done.  However, the level or 
resource mobilization is affected by so many factors besides the degree of collective 
action that it is preferable to focus on the likelihood of collective acti n.  Physical 
conditions of the infrastructure play a large role, as does the periodicity of repairs.  For 
example, a site that had flooding might have to mobilize significant resources in a year, 
as would a site that had never cleaned their canal, where s one that had been regularly 
maintaining the canals might have a lower level of resource mobilization because they 
had been working together for many years.  
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maintenance.  On a per household basis, farmers are contributing an average of Rs. 311 
per year for collective maintenance.  These contributions are in addition to irrigation fees 
and labor contributions to clean watercourses.  The value of farmers' contributions may 
be even greater than indicated by simple comparisons with government O&M 
expenditures, if farmers' associations use their resources more efficiently than the 
government agency.  For example, farmers' groups incur only direct costs, and do not pay 
contractors' commissions or the overhead for maintaining a large bureaucracy.  
Furthermore, where farmers use accurate local information to judge where work most 
needs to be done, it increases the efficiency of maintenance resources.  (We should not 
idealize, however, as farmers may also lack technical information on maintenance 
procedures, and undercut a canal or make other costly mistakes.)
Collective lobbying was also costly for farmers.  The cash expenses alone for 
interacting with various officials (especially Irrigation Department or CADA staff) 
averaged nearly Rs. 1,500 across all sitethat do some form of joint interaction.  The 
minimum expenditure was a nominal expense (approximately Rs. 10) for preparing a 
petition, but this could range up to Rs. 7,500, as in one case in Chambal where large 
groups of farmers were making repeated trips o the irrigation department.  Farmers in 
Chambal traveled by tractor trolley, at a cost of Rs. 500 per trip (for 20 people).  In other 
cases transport was by bus, but even this could be expensive, especially in IGNP, where 
travel distances are long.  Nor does this include the value of people's time.  There may be 
a trade-off between resources expended on lobbying and on cleaning the minor.  If 
farmers' associations are taking large groups to irrigation department offices several times 
a year to request maintenance or system improvements that will give them more water 
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(with a variable likelihood of success), it may be cheaper and take less time for those 
same farmers to spend the time in directly cleaning the minor themselves.   
Viewed in one way, the levl of resources mobilized for these activities 
demonstrates that farmers can and do pay considerable amounts for irrigation—in 
addition to the official irrigation fees.  But the fact that farmers are already paying such 
large amounts does not mean that they will be willing to pay higher official charges, 
especially if they are not sure of how the money will be used, or what benefits they will get.  
Where they are currently undertaking this collective action, it is because they have incentives 
in the form ofa clear need and some confidence that their work will improveconditions. 
In addition to the maintenance of minors that farmers' associations have 
undertaken and paid for by themselves, which is considered as collective action in this 
study, there are also many instances in which farmers' organizations have undertaken 
maintenance work under contract with the irrigation agency.  This is especially common 
in IGNP, where a lack of an alternative labor force has driven the Irrigation Department 
to use farmers to get the work done.  Pilot registered societies in UKP and Chambal have 
also obtained permission to become the contractors for maintenance of their own minors, 
and the possibility to take up maintenance of their facilities under contract is becoming a 
common incentive for farmers' groups to organize.  This has some potential advantages, 
because the farmers have a vested interest in making sure the work is done well, and 
therefore may be more efficient in doing the work.  Further, the contractors' commission 
can go to the association's account, and provide a source of revenue for the organization.  
However, it does not mobilize additional resources for irrigation, and can even displace 
resources the farmers would have otherwise raised for maintenance.  Where there is the 
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expectation that they may be able to get the government to pay them to do the work, 
organizations may wait rather than going ahead with necessary repairs.  Unless some 
form of linkage is made between farmers' payments and O&M work done, contracting 
with WUAs to do maintenance on their own facilities is likely to undermine objectives of 
mobilizing additional resources for irrigation systems through participatory programs.  
 
7.   CONCLUSIONS 
Policies to increase farmer participation in irrigation represent a significant shift 
in the approach to major surface irrigation systems in India.  While lessons from the 
experience in other countries can be valuable, it is not possible to recreate the experience 
of other countries.  Building on existing patterns of cooperation in Indian canal systems is 
more likely to lead to success.  But for this we need a better understanding of the factors 
that facilitate and constrain farmer participation.  
Our empirical study in Rajasthan and Karnataka indicates that there are ac ive 
formal and informal institutions and organizations for water management at the local 
level, although these have not expanded far beyond the pilot sites.  Farmers are also 
engaged in collective action for maintenance of minor canals and distributaries, and quite 
active in collective lobbying efforts.  In some cases the resources farmers commit for 
these activities are considerable; however, in other cases farmers undertake no such 
collective work on irrigation systems, even in some cases where formal water users' 
organizations have been established.   
What factors contribute to farmers' organizing and undertaking irrigation-related 
activities together?  Results of this study suggest that, controlling for other factors, 
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Rajasthan has had more succes  in organizing farmers.  Water supply (indicated by 
head/middle/tail location in the system) is not a major constraint.  Size of the command 
area and distance to market play a larger role, along with leadership and social capital 
(indicated by influential persons, college graduates, and number of temples, but not other 
economic cooperatives in the village). 
These findings suggest that irrigation devolution programs are most likely to 
succeed in establishing organizations if they begin with somewhat larger command ar as 
(although there may be an upper limit for size of units), and those which are relatively 
closer to market centers, as these are the factors that are significantly related with 
organization in the study areas.  Organizers are likely to find more fertile ground where 
there is established social capital, or patterns of cooperation in other spheres.  This study 
suggests that temples or religious institutions provide better indicators of this social 
capital than formal economic cooperatives.  Finally, leadership potential is critical.  Both 
traditional leadership, represented by influential persons from the local area, and modern 
leadership, represented by college graduates, can play an important role.  Taking 
advantage of the local social capital and leadership potential is likely to lead to more 
active organizations, but it may also require flexibility in approaches, to allow local 
people to tailor the organizations to their own needs and capacities.   
Farmers’ becoming active in maintenance of miors is an important objective of 
PIM programs, and in this case predicted organization did significantly increase the 
likelihood of such collective action.  However, minors that involve multiple villages are 
less likely to have such collective action.  Even though not all organizations are yet active 
in maintenance above the outlet, the fact that organizations have played a role in 
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maintenance indicates there is a value to organizational activities.  Moreover, if farmers 
are more effective in the use of their own resources than the government agency and 
contractors who currently do the work, the effect on long-term irrigation performance 
may be even greater than the cash contributions would indicate.  Farmers’ contributions 
for lobbying provide an important role in communications, though resources may not 
always be used in the most effective manner.   
Based on these findings, efforts to promote farmers' organizations for irrigation 
management do have a payoff.  Focusing on areas that are most likely to be receptive to 
organization is likely to increase the establishment of organizations.  If these are 
successful (in the farmers' estimation), there can be further spontaneous adoption, or later 
efforts to promote the organizations.  However, organizations should not be treated as an 
end in themselves.  For farmers to play a significant role in all of the critical functions of 
irrigation management including allocation, distribution, operation and maintenance 
(O&M), and conflict resolution (Coward 1980), there is also a need for local institutions 
(clearly defined rules) to allocate and distribute water, institutions to manage conflicts, 
and collective action for operation and maintenance.  Thus, PIM programs and the staff 
that implement them need to keep these larger objectives in mind.  In this regard, the 
approach of the Area Development Commissioner of Chambal is appropriate: he stated 
that he judges the performance of the CADA staff charged with organizing farmers in 
terms of the length of minors that are ultim t ly cleaned and maintained by local farmers.   
Structural conditions may partially explain the nature of organizations and degree 
of collective action, but they do not tell the whole story.  It is possible to identify factors 
that affect the incentives o participate, but the costs and benefits are not limited to 
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quantifiable, objective criteria.  The role of seemingly 'idiosyncratic' features such as the 
involvement of particular people and their motivation should not be neglected.  This is 
particularly true of leadership.  The involvement of a charismatic or trusted individual 
reduces the transaction costs of organizing and provides assurance that makes people 
more willing to participate in collective action (Kolavalli 1995; Baland and Platteau 
1996).  At the same time, organizations that depend on particular individuals are also 
vulnerable to leadership disputes.  Personal connections that inspire people to become 
involved may also create factionalism and shifting alliances that creates barriers to 
collective action.  In many cases, the disputes affecting irrigation may arise from some 
seemingly unrelated issue, such as a dispute over land, marriage, or even ceremonies (for 
examples, see Pradhan and Pradhan 2000).  To present an accurate picture of incentives 
for farmer participation, structural analyses need to be balanced with actor-oriented 
approaches, especially for the understanding of leadership. 
As policies and programs to devolve natural resource management from 
governments to user groups are adopted in more and more countries and resource sectors, 
it is essential that we move beyond simplistic and optimistic views that users can (or 
cannot) manage the resources, to recognition that users’ willingness and ability to take on 
additional responsibilites will vary across locations, as well as over time.  Identifying the 
factors that contribute to effective resource management by user groups can make a 
valuable contribution in identifying where devolution programs will take root most 
easily, and where additional efforts are likely to be needed.  But doing this requires 
moving from theoretical to empirical analysis, from isolated case studies to comparative 
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analysis, and from looking only at recognized organization to looking for the collective 
action that is done with (or without) the organizations. 
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